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Most of the current economic literature on social learning goes back to the seminal
model introduced by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992). It captures essen-
tial points of diverse situations such as investments in financial markets, technology
adoption, sequential voting, mating choice, takeover decisions, etc.: In a sequence of
Bayesian decision-makers that want to act according to the true but uncertain state of
the world, players hold private information and observe their predecessors’ decisions.
A striking conformity and a wastefully low revelation of private information are pre-
dicted to eventually emerge in form of an information cascade.
The experimental investigation of social learning was initiated by Anderson and Holt
(1997, AH henceforth), whose basic setup is still used in most recent experiments:
Subjects observe a binary private draw that reveals the state of the world correctly with
a probability of 2{3. Before subjects choose a binary action with the aim of matching
the state, they can observe the actions of all predecessors.
Due to the coarse binary structure, this setting provides only limited information
about the reasoning underlying the observed decisions. Eyster and Rabin (2010, p.
236) criticize that “the existing experimental literature is generally not well-designed
to differentiate among likely hypotheses about the nature of observational learning.”
For example, they introduce a model of naı¨ve inference which corresponds to a best
response to truthful play (Best response trailing naı¨ve inference, BRTNI) and notice
that the predictions of play in the AH setup coincide with those of Bayesian-Nash
play. Furthermore, even quite distinct behavioral models such as Quantal Response
Equilibrium (QRE, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) and cognitive hierarchy (Camerer,
Ho and Chong, 2004) make similar predictions for action data and lead to similarly
good fits of the data as shown by Goeree, Palfrey, Rogers and McKelvey (2007).
This paper sets out to differentiate between hypotheses about the nature of social
learning with the help of three kinds of experimental data. First, I investigate behavior
in the AH setting with the help of intra-team communication, using an experimental
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design that was introduced by Burchardi and Penczynski (2014). The communication
protocol provides incentivized written accounts of individual reasoning which allow
me to distinguish various types of inference. Second, I analyze existing data from a
social learning framework with continuous strategies and signals established by C¸elen
and Kariv (2004, C¸K henceforth). A “fingerprint” of 15 decisions from each subject
is able to differentiate various types of behavior in a way methodologically similar to
studies in the strategic thinking literature (for example, Costa-Gomes, Crawford and
Broseta, 2001). Finally, using intra-team communication within this framework allows
me to cross-validate results from message contents and choice profiles and check for
omitted types.
In order to fix ideas about types of inference, I specify a level-k model of social
learning that encompasses a variety of types proposed in the literature.1 Like the level
of reasoning model of strategic thinking (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-
Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Camerer et al., 2004), the model organizes types by the
number of iterated best responses to uninformative level-0 play. A level-1 player be-
lieves that all predecessors’ actions stem from such level-0 play; her best response is
therefore to follow the private signal. Believing all others to play according to their
signal, the level-2 player views all previous actions as similarly informative as her own
private signal. Level-3 players realize that some level-2 actions do not reflect private
signals and assess them as uninformative. And so on for level-4, level-5, etc.
In all instances of the data analysis, I find evidence in favor of the modeled het-
erogeneity and inferential naı¨vety. Subjects of level-1, level-2 and level-3 are de-
tected throughout. The modal type in every analysis turns out to be level-2, which
is equivalent to Eyster and Rabin’s (2010) “BRTNI” or Hung and Plott’s (2001) “naı¨ve
Bayesians”.
1The idea of a level-k model of social learning is not new to this paper. Ku¨bler and Weizsa¨cker
(2004) model a related heterogeneity in an error-rate model. Goeree et al. (2007), Dominitz and
Hung (2009), Eyster and Rabin (2010) and Bohren (2015) discuss cognitive hierarchy or level-k as
possible alternatives to their models.
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The paper contributes to a large experimental literature that, starting with the seminal
paper by AH, set out to investigate behavior in social learning. Studies in that literature
generally find substantial deviations from Bayesian inference but rarely focus on the
nature of those. Most studies used either QRE frameworks which modeled deviations
as random noise (for example, C¸elen and Kariv, 2004; Choi, Gale and Kariv, 2005;
Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider, 2005) or relied on data from the AH setup which
is less informative about the nature of deviations (see, for example, the papers ana-
lyzed in Weizsa¨cker, 2010). Few studies collected complementary data. For example,
Ziegelmeyer, Koessler, Bracht and Winter (2010) elicit beliefs about signals and states
of the world. Ku¨bler and Weizsa¨cker (2004) give the option to buy at a cost further
signals, C¸elen and Hyndman (2012) allow for costly link formation. Both methods al-
low to infer subjects’ beliefs. The intra-team communication in this experiment gives
a very direct insight into subjects’ reasoning and is therefore well-suited to investigate
the nature of social learning.
The paper also contributes to the large literature on strategic thinking (Crawford,
Costa-Gomes and Iriberri, 2013) and shows that the level-k concept is useful to de-
scribe naı¨ve inference in social learning. Level-k models have been implemented in
other private information settings like common value auctions (Crawford and Iriberri,
2007) and zero-sum betting (Brocas, Carrillo, Wang and Camerer, 2014). Both appli-
cations feature strategic interaction as well as inference of private information. The
investigation of social learning abstracts from strategic interaction and shows that the
inference alone is equally well described with this framework.
The methodology of generating incentivized written accounts of reasoning allows
for illuminating results that are complementing insights from action data and neuroe-
conomic data. The topic of “theory of mind” that treats the capacity of human subjects
to think about the state of mind of another human subject has received a lot of attention
in neuroeconomics (for example, Hampton, Bossaerts and O’Doherty, 2008; Coricelli
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and Nagel, 2009). When observed through the lens of incentivized verbalization, the
various stages – or levels – of complexity that these theories of mind attain are identi-
fied very concretely in the present study.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the general model and the
experimental design. Section 2 presents the results of the experiments with intra-team
communication in the AH framework. Section 3 presents the analysis of C¸K’s original
data as well as new data with intra-team communication. Section 4 concludes.
1. General model and experimental design
1.1. The general model
Countably infinite players identified by their position in the sequence t P N take ac-
tions at P tA,Bu sequentially. The payoff of player t is determined by the match with
the unknown state of the world ω P tA,Bu, that is,
pitpatq 
"
1, if at  ω,
0, if at  ω.
Both states are ex ante equally likely. A player t receives a private signal st P S that in-
duces a private belief Prpω  A|stq P p0, 1q. Further, each player observes the history
of actions up to round t1,Ht1  ta1, a2, . . . , at1u. Each observed action ai inHt1
induces beliefs ψi P S, a probability measure over the signal space S. Inferring likely
signals from observed actions is reflected as mapping I :
t1
i1tA,Bui ÞÑ
t1
i1 Si.
Importantly, in a level of reasoning model, the inference depends on the population
beliefs of player t, which, for simplicity, are assumed to be homogeneous and degen-
erate on level k  1. The strategy of player t of level k is denoted σkt pst, I
k1pHt1qq
and maps the private signal st and the inference from the observed history Ik1pHt1q
into an action at P tA,Bu in a way that the expected payoff under the available infor-
mation is maximized. Not regarding or not being able to infer a signal is reflected with
the empty signal or inference ∅ for which Prpω  A|∅q  1
2
.
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As usually assumed, the level-0 player randomizes uniformly over the action space
and thus plays irrespectively of his own signal and the observed history: σ0t p∅,∅q 
UptA,Buq. Intuitively, such a level-0 player lacks either an understanding of the game
or the motivation to use any information for his action.
The level-1 player assumes others to be level-0 players and best responds accord-
ingly.2 The recovery of the private signals of preceding level-0 players is not possible
because no preceding action is connected to the private signal. Solely the own private
signal is informative to level-1 players and enters their strategy, σ1t pst, I
0pHt1qq 
σ1t pst,∅q. This player understands how her private signal is informative but either ex-
pects others to play randomly or does not understand how others’ decisions can be like
hers: informative.
While level-1 players disregard the history of what is perceived as uninformative
actions, level-2 strategies rely on it heavily since all predecessors’ actions are believed
to be based exclusively on the private signals. The level-2 strategy simply aggregates
the own signal and what seem to be the others’ signals given only their action. This
player does not see how others might be like him: influenced by their history.
Level-3 players understand that level-2 players are influenced strongly in their choice
by their predecessors’ choices. They thus differentiate individual predecessors by their
specific history when inferring from their action. Level-3 is the lowest type to do so.
Knowing to which extent previous choices matter for level-3, level-4 players will take
this into account for their inference, and so on will higher level players. Depending
on the social learning framework, there can be a point in the hierarchy from which on
levels cannot be distinguished by their actions.
2Crawford and Iriberri (2007) distinguish two level-0 types, a truthful and a random one. In my setup,
since one is a best response to the other, they both induce a similar set of types. The exhibition is
easier with a single set. Any difference between higher types would be merely semantic.
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1.2. Similar models in the literature
The level-k types in this model make similar action predictions as various types of
behavior that have been proposed in the literature. Table 1 provides a short list of those
types and points out conceptual differences. It shows special noisy cases of the QRE
model as used, for example, in Goeree et al. (2007) or in the related model by Ku¨bler
and Weizsa¨cker (2004) which incorporates limited depth of reasoning. Furthermore,
Eyster and Rabin’s (2005) cursedness takes the same manifestation as level-1 in social
learning although it is formulated in an equilibrium context. If players believe that such
types exist, concepts like BRTNI (Eyster and Rabin, 2010) naturally arise. The level-3
player framework infers – due to the modelled population belief – signals when actions
in cascades are impossible to result from level-2 play. In the AH setup this predicts the
same actions and beliefs as a Bayesian that infers information from non-equilibrium
cascade deviations, put forward by AH (p. 850).
Regarding network structure, the similarity between level-1 types and rational play-
ers at socially uninformed nodes in general networks is noteworthy. Both can take
an important role as sources of new private information, as results in Acemoglu et al.
(2011) point out for the latter case.
The level-k model thus gives an interesting range of types that the informative data
in this study can potentially distinguish. Other models of reasoning are not nested
or easily discriminated, so that this study will be silent on their relevance for social
learning. For example, Guarino and Jehiel (2013) use the analogy-based equilibrium
concept (Jehiel, 2005) in social learning to the effect that players know how the fre-
quencies of actions relate to the state of the world, but are not able to relate it to the
specific history or the private signal of others. Similarly, the cognitive hierarchy model
by Camerer et al. (2004) differs from level-k models most substantially in the non-
degenerate population belief. Both models differ from the proposed model in subtle
ways that are likely to go beyond the discriminatory power of the data at hand.
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Study Comment/Difference
Level-0 player
Crazy type Smith and Sørensen (2000) Plays a fixed action
Fully noisy player e.g. Goeree et al. (2007) λ  0
Level-1 player
Private-information revealer Hung and Plott (2001)
“Follow your own signal”-type Ku¨bler and Weizsa¨cker (2004) λ1 Ñ8, λ2  0
Fully cursed player Eyster and Rabin (2005) Equilibrium type, fails to see link
between predecessors’ types and
actions
Socially uninformed type Bohren (2015) Observes private signal only
Level-2 player
Naı¨ve Bayesian Hung and Plott (2001)
“Counting heuristic”-type Ku¨bler and Weizsa¨cker (2004) λ1  λ2 Ñ8, λ3  0
Best Response Trailing Naı¨ve
Inference (BRTNI)
Eyster and Rabin (2010) Best response to fully cursed player
Level-3 player
Bayesian Anderson and Holt (1997) Equilibrium type, but infers from
non-equilibrium cascade deviations
in AH setup
 λ is the precision in a logistic choice function, λi relates to the ith iterated best response.
Table 1: Behavioral types related to level-k types.
1.3. Population belief
For ease of exposition, the model is so far formulated with a degenerate population be-
lief.3 While non-degenerate beliefs are straightforward to incorporate, the sequential
nature of the social learning decisions introduces a further challenge. Because individ-
ual players differ by their location and the information they hold, successors potentially
hold differentiated beliefs about them. The mere history can contain information that
allows a player to update her population belief. For example, a level-3 player observes
an action that cannot come from a level-2 player given her history.
To account for this sequential structure, I propose a model with a nearly degenerate
population belief. Before observing his history, a level-k player believes with near
certainty that all predecessors are level k  1, attributing very small probabilities to
the levels further below. In particular, I assume that pk,k1i  1 
°k1
d1 ε
d and pk,li 
εpk1ql for l  0, . . . , k  2, for a small and positive constant ε. Upon observing the
3Data from beauty contest games suggest that this is a reasonable assumption (Nagel, 1995; Costa-
Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Burchardi and Penczynski, 2014).
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history, the player uses Bayes’ rule to update the population belief on each predecessor.
In the example, the prior beliefs are p3,2i  1  ε  ε
2, p3,1i  ε, and p
3,0
i  ε
2. If the
action is equally likely to come from level-0 and level-1, the updated population belief
is nearly degenerate on level-1: p3,0i 
ε
ε 1
and p3,1i 
1
ε 1
.
This specification is chosen for two reasons. First, if an observed action and history
rule out that the player is of level-k 1, the update with Bayes’ rule for this individual
leads again to a nearly degenerate population belief on level k  2. Second, with this
formulation ties are broken in favor of the inference under a population belief of level-
k2 or lower. For example, level-2 players break ties that would arise under p2,1i  1 in
favor of their private information due to the remaining ε probability of random level-0
play.
1.4. Team communication
One measure that this study takes to overcome the problem of limited insight into the
nature of social learning is the gathering of complementary information about par-
ticipants’ reasoning process. For that purpose, I conducted two experiments with an
intra-team communication protocol that yields incentivized written accounts of sub-
jects’ reasoning (Burchardi and Penczynski, 2014).4
The communication protocol incentivizes the individuals’ messages within the team
as follows. Participants are randomly assigned into teams of two players. The two
members are connected through the modified chat module of the experiment software.5
Once the situation is observed, each team member can state a so-called “suggested de-
cision” and justify it in a written message. As soon as this is done for the first three
situations, the suggestions and messages get exchanged simultaneously. In a next step,
both team members individually state their “final decision” for the three first decisions.
It is known to them that for each situation one of the two team members’ final deci-
4Instructions are reprinted in sections C and E of the online appendix.
5The experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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sions will be chosen randomly by the computer to count as the “team’s action”. This
construction provides incentives to state the full reasoning underlying the suggested
decision in a clear and convincing way.
In contrast to the original design in Burchardi and Penczynski (2014), subjects first
write suggested decisions for three situations before both the suggested decisions and
the messages are simultaneously exchanged. This ensures that the first three messages
are written prior to any communication with the team partner and reflect only the indi-
vidual’s reasoning. The same procedure is repeated for the last three decisions.6
The message is entered freely without explicit space or time limitations. In the AH
experiment, apart from the suggested decision, another structured part of the communi-
cation consists of quantifying the confidence in the proposal. Subjects can put numbers
between 50 and 100, indicating the subjective probability that their suggested decision
coincides with the true state of the world. As part of the incentivized communication
stage, this is similar to eliciting individual beliefs.
The messages are classified independently by two research assistants (RA). For each
individual message they indicate the level of reasoning that the message corresponds
to most closely. For this task, the RAs are introduced to the level-k model and receive
detailed instructions about characteristics of the individual types.7
The following features of reasoning are derived from the model and should be
present for the message to be classified as a certain level. Random level-0 play re-
sults from misunderstanding the nature of the game or from putting arguments that
are orthogonal to any reasonable inference from private signals and public actions.
Level-1 play features an open disregard of others’ actions or a strong emphasis on the
unambiguity of the own signal in contrast to others’ decisions. Level-2 play requires
that others’ actions are taken at face value as a signal and predecessors are not dif-
6Having messages exchanged after three rather than one suggested decision has the advantage that all
three messages are not “contaminated” by the team partner’s arguments. In the original setup with
an immediate exchange, this would only be true for the very first message.
7Instructions for the RAs are reprinted in sections D and F of the online appendix.
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ferentiated. In contrast to this, level-3 play distinguishes individual predecessors and
evaluates the information content of the action for each of them.
Both RAs first provide independent sets of classifications. After this, both are anony-
mously informed about all classifications of the other RA and have the possibility to
revise their own classification. This iteration serves to reconsider diverging classifica-
tions and to screen errors or misperceptions. Importantly, the information is merged
by using only those classifications that coincide between the two RAs. The RAs agree
in a large majority of classifications (AH: 567 (541) out of 636, 89.2% (85.1%); C¸K:
218 (194) out of 252, 86.5% (77.0%); pre-revision in brackets). In AH, 17 out of
1272 individual RA level classifications imply a different decision than observed in
the suggested decision. 10 of those come from 5 decisions in which the two RAs
agree, suggesting a discrepancy between message and suggested decision on the sub-
ject side.8
1.5. Hypotheses
On the basis of the described model, I can formulate hypotheses that can be tested
thanks to the communication data and C¸K’s action data.
Hypothesis 1 Classified in terms of level-k types, reasoning in social learning situa-
tions is heterogeneous.
Hypothesis 2 The level-k distribution is hump-shaped and features level-1 or level-2
reasoning as most common types.
This hypothesis is motivated by commonly observed distributions in the level-k lit-
erature (Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Arad and Rubinstein, 2012) as well as the
main types discussed in the social learning literature (see table 1).
8Burchardi and Penczynski (2014) provide further evidence for the robustness and replicability of this
kind of classification.
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Hypothesis 3 The communicated reasoning is not different from the theoretical type’s
reasoning.
2. Anderson and Holt (1997)
2.1. The model
The framework used by AH has a simple binary information structure with states of the
world ω P tA,Bu, private signals st P tA,Bu, and actions at P tA,Bu. The private
signal is informative with Prps  ωq  2
3
.
The level-0 player randomizes over the action space, σ0t p∅,∅q  UptA,Buq. As
in the general case, the level-1 player best-responds by simply following his signal,
σ1t pst, IpHt1qq  σ
1
t pst,∅q  st. Best responding to this, the level-2 player views
previous decisions as equally informative as her own signal, I1pHt1q  Ht1, and
aggregates the information by counting the evidence – be it previous actions or the
private signal – for a given state of the world. Consequently, the level-3 player can
infer the private signal from the resulting actions only if a different signal had caused
the level-2 player to choose a different action.
Note that in this environment level-2 and level-3 strategies yield the same actions,
they only differ in their beliefs about the state of the world. In turn, level-3 actions and
beliefs are identical to those of Bayesians for a given history in equilibrium. Conse-
quently, players of levels higher than 3 only differ in the population belief and not in
their actions or beliefs about the state of the world. This shows why in this framework
action data alone is not well-suited to distinguish certain forms of behavior, as noted
by Eyster and Rabin (2010).
2.2. Experimental procedures
The AH experiment was conducted in 7 experimental sessions at the LEEDR Labora-
tory of Cornell University. In teams of two, 106 mostly undergraduate students were
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Urn choice
1 2 3 4 5 6
Information BBAb BAABAb BAAa BBABa ABAAAb BAAAb
Suggested decision 0.953 0.689 0.057 0.538 0.415 0.547
Confidence 69.76 60.75 69.14 64.27 67.17 64.68
Probability Level-0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
of choice B Level-1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Level-2/-3/Bay. 1 1 0 1 0 0
Notes:  A and B denote observed actions, a and b denote private signals favoring A or B, respectively.
 Suggested decisions are reported in fractions of choice B.  For urn choices 1 and 4, the Bayesian
probability of choice is not restricted to 1 in equilibrium since the histories are off the equilibrium path.
Table 2: Suggested decisions and confidences as well as choice probabilities for differ-
ent theoretical types in the 6 urn choices (N  106)
taking decisions in 6 social learning situations that arose in the original experiment of
AH. I chose decision situations with a substantial history of public information. Differ-
ent types take different decisions in some but not all of them, since in this framework,
those situations are somewhat particular.
A session took on average 60 minutes and led to average payments of 11.30 USD
per subject. In the experiment, the binary setting described in section 2.1 has equally
likely states ω P tA,Bu reflected by two urnsA andB. The signals s P tWhite,Blacku
are informative draws from the urns, where urn A contains 2 white and 1 black ball
and urn B contains 1 white and 2 black balls. Possible actions are a P tA,Bu.
2.3. Results from team communication data
Table 2 gives an overview of the 6 implemented urn choices. The first line gives the
information (history and signal) available to subjects. The next two lines give means
of the suggested decisions and confidences observed in the experiment. The suggested
decisions take values A or B and the confidences take values between 50 and 100. The
majority of urn choices 1-3 are in accordance with the predictions given in the last
three lines. For choice 4-6, subjects are split between A and B.
The messages from the intra-team communication give direct information about in-
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Highest level ( 1.66)
0 1 2 3 NA Total
0 8 3 3 1 0 15
Lowest level 1 12 6 0 0 18
( 1.38) 2 40 3 0 43
3 1 0 1
NA 29 29
Total 8 15 49 5 29 106
Table 3: Level classification in first three decisions
dividuals’ reasoning. In the upcoming analysis, I focus on the first three decisions that
were taken prior to any contact with the team partner.9 I pool the information from
the first three decisions and consider all coinciding level classifications other than NA.
Table 3 summarizes the data by giving the subjects’ lowest and highest level over these
three decisions.10 29 subjects (27%) are not classified, mostly because they did not
write any message on any decision. 79% of the remaining 77 subjects are attributed a
single level.
Focusing on the marginal distributions or the numbers of subjects on the diagonal
with coinciding lowest and highest level, the table reflects a pronounced heterogeneity
with all levels 0-3 arising at least once, thus supporting hypothesis 1. By a large
margin, the mode behavior is level-2 with 40 subjects classified exclusively as level-2,
a result which supports hypothesis 2.
Messages. In the following, a closer look at the messages investigates hypothesis
3 and the question whether subjects’ comments differ from the reasoning postulated in
9The classification for the last three decisions is reported in table 16 on page 39. A Wilcoxon signed-
rank test does not reject the hypothesis that the level lower bounds or the level upper bounds are the
same between the first three decisions (table 3) and the last three decisions (table 16, plower  0.515,
pupper  0.470). To control for order effects, the order of choices was reversed in the last three
sessions. If the choices are not numbered, the analysis presents the temporal order of the decisions,
i. e. the “first three decisions” will always refer to the decisions taken without prior conversation with
the team partner.
10The data excludes any outcome of a non-classification (NA). If all three decisions are not classified
(NA), the subject appears under NA. For more details, table 17 on page 40 reports this data by
decision. Tables 22 and 23 in the online appendix report the data of both RAs on an individual level.
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the model.
Level-0. The model is based on uninformative level-0 reasoning, which is modeled
by random play. The exemplary messages in table 9 on page 32 show that subjects
misunderstand the game or self-report to have no understanding of the game. Fittingly,
more than 70% of those messages come with the lowest possible confidence of 50.
Interestingly, only 2 out of the 24 decisions from level-0 players are not in line with
the private signal. Based on those, therefore, 6 subjects would be classified as level-1
rather than level-0 players in the model. The literature suggests a truthful level-0 type
(Crawford and Iriberri, 2007), which could be an alternative explanation that fits the
decisions, the communication as well as the confidence.
Level-1. The messages that are categorized as level-1 reasoning illustrate an incre-
ment of understanding beyond level-0. Table 10 shows that subjects mostly explain
why the private draw is informative and often report a confidence of 66 or 67 based on
this single private signal. Subjects follow their signal without exception. Rather than
explicitly expecting random behavior in their predecessors, subjects express confusion
or ignorance as to how to make use of the observed history.
Level-2. Tables 11 and 12 show how subjects classified as level-2 take into account
the history of others’ actions in addition to their private signal. Characteristically, this
perception of other players is, however, not very differentiated. The observed history
is often summarized in statistics reporting, for example, that “3 out of 5 predecessors
selected A”, without taking into account the predecessors’ position or choice situation.
As a result, subjects can become very confident in their own choice. The information
from the history is then mostly combined with the odds of the private draw being
correct. As modelled, level-2 players do craft a model of others’ reasoning: the simple
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one of truthful play.11
Level-3. Finally, tables 13 and 14 present communication that was classified as re-
flecting level-3 reasoning. As expected from the model, the messages show clearly
how players differentiate between predecessors, make use of the knowledge they have
about individual histories, are aware that other might just have followed their history
and try to back out private signals. The model of their predecessors’ thinking is clearly
more elaborate than those of lower levels. In the few few observations, the updating of
the population belief is compatible with the nearly degenerate population belief (see,
for example, subject 15 at BBAb).
3. C¸elen and Kariv (2004)
3.1. The model
The setting implemented in C¸K has discrete actions at P tA,Bu but continuous, uni-
formly distributed, signals st  U r10, 10s and a state of the world defined as
ω 
"
A, if
°T
t1 st ¥ 0,
B, otherwise.
Usually, a strategy would map the observed history and the signal into an action.
Since the expected payoffs are monotonic in the private signal, the optimal strategies
are summarized in a threshold θ P r10, 10s. In the experiment, subjects choose
a threshold before seeing their own signal. After the realization of the signal, the
computer derives actions from the thresholds as follows,
σtpst, θq 
"
A if st ¥ θ,
B if st   θ.
(1)
11The model by Guarino and Jehiel (2013) predicts similar behavior with the difference that the public
information is used directly as evidence for the state of the world, not regarding the connections
to predecessors’ private signals. Although it is not clear what fraction of A and B actions players
expect in the different states of the world, it seems more plausible from the messages that the actions
are simply viewed as identical to the signal rather than evaluated according to a certain belief as to
how often they occur in each of the states of the world.
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As opposed to the general setup, strategies will therefore be given by the threshold θ.
Consequently, the observed action only indicates that the signal is above or below the
unobserved threshold. The inference from the action thus requires above all a belief
about the threshold θˆ. In conjunction with the observed action, a possible range of the
signal realization can be inferred and leads to an expected value of the signal.
A rational Bayesian player uses previous actions as well as beliefs about previous
thresholds to craft her optimal cutoff strategy,
θBt pHt1, tθˆ
B
i u
t1
i1q  E

t1¸
i1
si
Ht1, tθˆBi ut1i1
ﬀ
.
Bayesian inference assumes rational expectations with respect to the thresholds used
by the predecessors (see equations 1 and 2 in C¸K).
In the level-k model, a level-0 player randomizes over the strategy space,
θ0  U r10, 10s.
Although this is a plausible level-0 strategy, it turns out to be an atypical level-0
belief : because the computer processes the threshold and the signal automatically, the
resulting action is as informative as a threshold of 0. I therefore model the level-0
belief as randomizing uniformly over the two uninformative actions 10 and 10,
θˆ0t 
"
10, with Pr  0.5,
10, with Pr  0.5.
This level-0 belief reflects a uniform random choice of actions at P tA,Bu.12 The best
response for a level-1 player is to follow the private signal and play the cutoff strategy
θ1t pHt1, tθˆ
0
i u
t1
i1q  0.
For a level-2 reasoner, the observation of one action resulting from such a level-1
strategy leads to an expected signal of 5 after action A and 5 after action B. It fol-
lows that E
°t1
i1 si
Ht1, tθˆ1i  0ut1i1   5  #A  5  #B, where #a gives the
12The main role of the level-0 is commonly to provide a starting point for iterated beliefs. This con-
struction ensures in this particular, computer-assisted design that these beliefs start out with an as-
sumption of uninformative play. At the same time, it is important to allow for the existence of level-0
players that randomize over r10, 10s.
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number of previously played A or B actions. Thus, level-2 players reach the limits of
the strategy space very quickly and play 10 or 10 once one action was observed in
two more occasions than the other one. Here, the level-k model predicts information
cascades in which own signals are entirely disregarded (θ P t10, 10u). Only five dif-
ferent actions are predicted to be observed from a level-2 player, θ2t pHt1, tθˆ
1
i u
t1
i1q P
t10,5, 0, 5, 10u. The best response to level-2 play fully discounts actions that re-
sulted from an uninformative threshold of 10 or 10 and uses only the remaining
actions to infer signals, and so on for higher levels.
Due to the continuous strategy and signal space in this framework, higher level
thresholds can be differentiated. They form different beliefs about the informativeness
of observed actions and therefore choose different thresholds. This framework is thus
very well suited to experimentally investigate the level-k and other types. Already
C¸K’s experiment is informative about the type distribution.
The strategies can be recursively expressed as
θkt pHt1, tθˆ
k1
i u
t1
i1q  E

t1¸
i
si
Ht1, tθˆk1i ut1i1
ﬀ
.
3.2. Analyzing choice data
C¸K implemented their social learning framework in an experiment at New York Uni-
versity with 40 undergraduate subjects that played 15 independent rounds in sequences
of 8 players. After each completed sequence, participants were informed whether their
action coincided with the state of the world and were paid $2 if it did, and nothing
otherwise.
Thanks to the rich signal and action structure, I can use the 15 choices of each
subject to investigate her individual type. Similar to Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), I compare the chosen thresholds tθru15r1 to the
thresholds tθkr u
15
r1 that a theoretical level-k or rational type is predicted to choose in
the exact same 15 situations. I distinguish between the 4 types: level-1, level-2, level-3,
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and Bayesian, and assume the level types to hold nearly degenerate population beliefs
as specified in section 1.1.
I use the sum of squared differences, SSDk 
°15
r1pθr  θ
k
r q
2, k  1, 2, 3, B as
the distance metric between fingerprints of subjects and theoretical types.13 In order
to test whether observed behavior is close to a theoretical type by chance, I simulate
each type’s distribution of SSDk resulting from uniform random thresholds. The ob-
tained distributions are type-specific since, for example, random thresholds are closer
in quadratic distance to θ1  0 than to thresholds that frequently reach the limits of
the action space. I will use the resulting p-values of a given fingerprint for each type
not only in its original meaning in hypothesis testing, but with slight abuse also as a
type-independent measure of closeness between observed fingerprints and theoretical
types.
I classify fingerprints into types in two alternative ways. First, I classify subjects into
the type that gives the lowest significant SSDk (p-value ¤ 0.05). Second, I classify
subject i that is significantly close to, say, two types, i. e. with two types’ p-values
below 0.05, as partly one type and partly the other type. The share ski attributed to each
type is chosen anti-proportionally to its pk-value.14
3.3. Results from C¸elen and Kariv (2004) data
The original data from C¸K enables a first validation of the previous results in a different
setting. Figure 1 illustrates the data for individual subjects over 15 rounds arranged into
13I use the SSDk because calculating the more standard expected payoff for a cutoff in a given situa-
tion is very complex due to the payoff structure and the uniformly distributed signals. The SSDk
is a useful approximation since the probability of playing the correct action is quadratic in the cut-
off because the cutoff linearly influences i) the probability of playing a certain action and ii) the
probability of playing the correct action given the action played as long as the considered signal
realizations for all players are in p10, 10q.
14More precisely, if pki ¤ 0.05, the share is
ski 
Σ
pki°
tl:pli¤0.05u
Σ
pli
, with Σ 
¸
tl:pli¤0.05u
pli.
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(a) Level-1 play (subject 17) (b) Level-2 play (subject 8)
(c) Level-3 play (subject 25) (d) Bayesian play (subject 21)
Figure 1: Subjects’ and types’ “fingerprints” in the data of C¸K
“fingerprints” and compared to theoretical types.
Type k Frequency Fraction (%) pˆk
1 6 15.0 0.176
2 20 50.0 0.588
3 5 12.5 0.147
B 3 7.5 0.088
NA 6 15.0 –
Total 40 100.00 1
(a) Classification by lowest significant SSDk
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
1 6.42 16.0
2 18.61 46.5
3 4.07 10.2
B 4.90 12.3
NA 6.00 15.0
Total 40 100.00
(b) Classification by p-values below 0.05
Table 4: Type overview for 40 subjects in C¸K
The type distribution resulting from the first kind of classification is shown in table
4a.15 The players that do not differ significantly from random play for any type are
15Table 21 on page 1 of the online appendix reports the SSDk for each subject and type.
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reported as unclassified (NA). A pronounced heterogeneity of reasoning across the 40
subjects can be observed with each type being present at least a few times, supporting
hypothesis 1. The level-k distribution is hump-shaped and, by a large margin, the most
common behavior turns out to be level-2 play, again supporting hypothesis 2. Table
4b shows that the main results remain unchanged when taking into account how well
types can be differentiated.16
Like subject 8 in figure 1b, 7 players choose thresholds θ P t10,5, 0, 5, 10u in all
15 situations. Players classified as level-2 account for 103 of the 136 instances (75.7%)
of fully ignoring the own signal (θ P t10, 10u). The model thus proposes a simple
behavioral explanation for the information cascading that motivated C¸K’s study.
Goeree et al. (2007) show that their extensive AH-type data is equally well explained
by QRE as by the iterated best-response model of cognitive hierarchy. C¸K set up a
QRE model that features both random and rational behavior, with the latter taking into
account previous decision errors in a Bayesian way. Their data allows me to compare
the explanatory power of this model with the level-k model as presented in this paper.
For that purpose, I use the estimated parameter values that they present in table 3 and
recursively calculate the predicted cutoffs θˆ as described in equation 9 (C¸K, p. 492–
493). Analogously, I use the estimates of the level distribution pˆk in table 4a in order
to calculate the cutoffs under the level-k model. Again, the cutoffs are recursively
calculated as a mixture of the types’ cutoffs θk with the weights pˆk, with k  1, 2, 3, B,
θMix 
°
k θ
k  pˆk.
The distance between the models’ fitted cutoffs and the chosen cutoffs is judged
again by the SSD. The average SSD per decision is 34.6 in C¸K’s model and 27.3 in
the level-k model. The hypothesis that the two models explain behavior equally well is
rejected, the level-k cutoffs lead to significantly lower SSDs (Wilcoxon signed-rank
16The experiment was not explicitly designed to investigate behavior in one-shot situations. After each
of the 15 sequences, subjects received feedback on the state of the world and their payoff. The online
appendix B.2 shows that subjects seem to slowly learn over time.
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test, p   0.001). However, since the level-k estimates are on the individual level, the
level-k model has a larger degree of freedom than C¸K’s model. Indeed, in the out-
of-sample prediction for the data in the next section, the average SSD per decision is
lower for C¸K’s (21.5) than for the level-k predicted cutoffs (29.7).
3.4. Experimental procedures
I conducted the experiment with the team communication design in 4 experimental
sessions at the mLab of the University of Mannheim. In teams of two, the 42 mostly
undergraduate students were taking decisions in 6 social learning situations that arose
in the original experiment of C¸K. Again, I chose decision situations that occurred later
in the sequence and in which different types choose different thresholds. A session
took on average 60 minutes and led to average payments of 8.30 EUR per subject. In
both experiments, subjects are told at the beginning that they will experience situations
that arose in a previous experiment which was played by individuals.
3.5. Results from team communication data
For the team communication experiments in the C¸K framework, table 5 gives an
overview of the six implemented scenarios which were chosen in order to distinguish
types k  1, 2, 3, B as cleanly as possible. The first line gives the information about
the history available to subjects. The following lines give mean and standard deviation
of the choices in r10, 10s as well as predicted play by level-k and Bayesian players.
Like in section 3.3, the fingerprints of the six suggested decisions per subject can be
used to identify their type as illustrated in figure 3. The analysis of the SSDk yields
the results shown in table 6.17 Similar to the results in sections 2.3 and 3.3, pronounced
type heterogeneity and a mode behavior of level-2 can be observed.
17All six decisions are included since the analysis of the first three decisions is less powerful to reject
random play and yields significant results only for slightly more than 50% of the players. Results
for the first three and second three decisions are reported in tables 18 and 19, the type distributions
are not significantly different from each other (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p  0.703).
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Round
1 2 3 4 5 6
History AAB BBAA AAABA BBB AABA BABA
Sugg. decision (mean) 0.17 0.18 -3.52 4.29 -2.50 -0.48
Sugg. decision (s.d.) 4.20 3.95 5.26 5.43 4.84 3.02
Level-1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Predicted Level-2 -5 0 -10 10 -10 0
choice Level-3 -2.5 -5 -5 7.5 -5 -5
Bayesian 1.25 -5.625 -4.6875 8.75 -4.375 -3.125
Table 5: Empirical and predicted decisions in the 6 rounds (N  42)
(a) Level-1 play (cutoff  0, subject 36). (b) Level-2 play (subject 5).
(c) Level-3 play (subject 26). (d) Bayesian play (subject 12).
Figure 2
Subjects’ and types’ “fingerprints” in the team experiments a` la C¸K
Messages. Qualitatively, the messages in this experiment are very similar to the
ones reported in the AH setup.18 The level classification yields the results shown in
18All messages are in German and are available from the author. Table 8 shows translated examples of
very sophisticated ones.
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Type Frequency Fraction (%)
1 10 23.8
2 15 35.7
3 3 7.1
B 4 9.5
NA 10 23.8
Total 42 100.00
(a) Classification by lowest significant SSD
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
1 10.40 24.8
2 13.22 31.5
3 4.41 10.5
B 3.98 9.5
NA 10.00 23.8
Total 42 100.00
(b) Classification by p-value below 0.05
Table 6: Type overview for 42 subjects
table 7 for the first three rounds, table 20 on page 41 shows similar results for the
second three decisions. The reasoning is found to be heterogeneous and the mode
behavior is level-2 to a similar extent as before. At this point, it can be summarized
that – based on all analyses – hypotheses 1 and 2 can be evaluated positively.
Result 1 Classified in terms of level-k types, reasoning in social learning situations is
heterogeneous.
Result 2 The level-k distribution is hump-shaped and features level-2 reasoning as
most common types.
Highest level ( 2.03)
0 1 2 3 NA Total
0 1 0 1 0 0 2
Lowest level 1 3 0 0 0 3
( 1.86) 2 18 3 0 21
3 3 0 3
NA 13 13
Total 1 3 19 6 13 42
Table 7: Level classification in first three decisions, C¸K framework
Out of the 28.02 subjects that have been associated with a type 1, 2, or 3 in table 6b,
17.48 (62.4%) fall into the level intervals resulting from the classifications.19 Given
19Table 24 on page 4 of the online appendix reports individual classifications based on messages and
fingerprints.
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that slightly more than 70% are classified in table 7, this value indicates a high level of
agreement between the two methods. One interesting question relating to hypothesis 3
is at this point whether any message should be categorized as Bayesian reasoning?20
Both fingerprint analyses in the C¸K framework suggest the existence of Bayesian
types. Two out of all six players with a level-3 classification potentially exhibit Bayesian
reasoning. Their translated messages in the first three decisions are reported in table 8.
Subject 26 indeed clearly states in the first message the assumption that predeces-
sors played rationally. He is calculating correctly the expected signals following the
first two A’s in the history, but makes a rough guess for the B in the third position.
Since the sequences in decisions 2 and 3 are even longer, the subject simply takes into
account that players positioned later in the sequence have a strong signal when they
play against the majority. Although the message clearly reflects his assumption of ra-
tional preceding play, the fingerprint analysis identifies him as 80% level-3 and 20%
Bayesian due to his imprecisions (figure 2c).
Subject 9 starts reasoning about her predecessors with the implicit assumption of
rational play but forms expectations faultily. A signal between 0 and 10 results in an
expected threshold of 2. In the second message, the reasoning is not differentiating
predecessors at all and appears to be level-2. The very hesitant movements away from
0 make her fingerprint be classified as 53% level-1, with the remaining weight dis-
tributed across level-2, level-3 and Bayesian. Overall, there is some evidence from the
communication for the intention of a Bayesian approach to the game, but the imple-
mentation is quite distinct.
The two analyses based on the intra-team communication allow me to evaluate hy-
pothesis 3 as follows.
Result 3 The communicated reasoning is generally not different from the theoretical
20The question for omitted types can be investigated by a specification test that checks whether some
subjects’ fingerprints are closer to each other (“pseudotypes”) than to a theoretical type, see appendix
A.2. No missing type is found, only subjects which confuse signs (cluster D) and put too low
thresholds throughout (cluster E).
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type’s reasoning. The truthful actions of players classified as level-0 make the case
for a truthful level-0 type. Bayesian reasoning can be observed in fewer cases than
expected from the fingerprint analysis.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper applies the level of reasoning concept of iterated beliefs to social learning
and investigates experimentally the nature of social learning. Informative action data
from the C¸K framework as well as incentivized written accounts of reasoning provide
evidence of the heterogeneous types of reasoning known from strategic interaction.
The predominant mode of reasoning is level-2 reasoning which is similar to Eyster and
Rabin’s (2010) BRTNI type that overinfers from signals.
The nature of inference observed in this study gives a simple level-2 explanation for
the information cascades observed in C¸elen and Kariv (2004). Furthermore, the hetero-
geneity observed provides the context for a fruitful interplay between truthful level-0
and level-1 players that make private information available on the one side and level-
2+ players that use such information on the other side. Bohren (2015) and Acemoglu,
Dahleh, Lobel and Ozdaglar (2011) describe theoretically that a heterogeneous popu-
lation with private information revealers and naı¨ve or rational Bayesians that make use
of this information is able to accumulate enough information to certainly match the
state of the world asymptotically. Such an interplay can explain why social learning
among humans features self-correcting cascades as observed by Goeree et al. (2007).
Most likely, the level-k model is a very useful model of both strategic reasoning
and inference because it captures the cognitive processes involved in thinking about
the mental state of others. The communication data in this study shows how subjects
first struggle to understand the situation for themselves (level-0) and then play without
holding a definite model of others’ reasoning (level-1). The simplest theory of mind
is that others play truthfully (level-2). Also, the easiest way to obtain a new model
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26 AAB Hello. I propose that we assume that all participants before
decided rationally. The sequence suggests that at action 1
y ¡ 0. Expected value would so far be 5. Was this con-
sidered in action 2, the decision for all numbers greater than
5 would be A too. Expected value (5+2,5)/2=3,75. Was
this considered in action 3, b was chosen only for strongly
negative numbers. This is why I would propose b as well,
that is to say a negative number.
2 t3u
BBAA Decider 3 and 4 had more information, expected value con-
sequently positive. Would therefore tend to A. At each
x ¡ 3 jump to A.
3 t3u
AAABA Last participant has again most information. Apparently
participant 4 had a strongly negative number. Still, I would
be to chose A at negative numbers up to 5.
5 t3u
9 AAB Purely mathematically assumed: ;-) I am fourth and have
information A,A,B. The first should have set 0 as marginal
point to have a 50 50 chance. The second can thus be sure
that the first had a positive number. He thus sets his point a
bit higher at 2. With two A decisions the third can assume
that both previous numbers were positive, so he can coura-
geously bet on A with2. This might be too courageous, he
has maybe a negative number. Long speech, short meaning
A with still high risk -2
-2 t2, 3u
BBAA I am fifth with B,B,A,A as information. This gives a 50:50
chance so I would guess a 0.
0 t2u
AAABA 6. with information A,A,A,B,A assume: 1. chooses 0 Ñ
positive number, 2. chooses 0 as well Ñ positive num-
ber, 3. becomes more courageous chooses -2 Ñ possibly
small negative number but in sum still everything positive,
4. still more courageous -3, now we would be back in the
area around zero, so 5 chooses 0 again Ñ has a positive
number. Means we should be more courageous :D hehe I
think this makes little sense
-3 t3u
Notes: “Classification” gives the set of possible levels k not ruled out by the lower and upper bounds.
Table 8: Examples of messages potentially reflecting Bayesian reasoning
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of others’ minds is to attribute ways of thinking to them that oneself just has, lead-
ing to the modeled degenerate population belief. This way level-3 players believe that
some players might just follow the majority and hence do not act informatively. In
uncovering these perceptions, the communication data in this study complements neu-
roeconomic data on brain activity which has as well been generated to understand how
humans think about others’ minds (Hampton et al., 2008; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
In general, these results highlight that for social learning in financial markets, takeover
decisions, sequential voting, technology adoption, etc. to be successful, the decision-
maker has to know how observed decisions have been made previously. Not only the
quantity and quality of available information is relevant, but also the sophistication of
the preceding decision-makers that linked information and decision.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Messages by classified level (AH)
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27 BBAb I don’t know this is all probability so this is a guess B 50 –
BAABAb I have no clue. B 50 t0u
BAAa I have no clue. A 50 t0u
51 BBAb randomly choose my selection. i will choose B, u select A
and computer will take decison randomly on behalf of us
B 50 t0u
BAABAb randomly choose my selection. i will choose B, u select A
and computer will take decison randomly on behalf of us
B 50 t0u
BAAa randomly choose my selection. i will choose B, u select A
and computer will take decison randomly on behalf of us
B 50 t0u
79 BAAAb idk, just a guess B 50 t0u
ABAAAb just a guess B 50 t0u
BBABa just a guess A 50 t0u
Notes: “Classification” gives the set of possible levels k not ruled out by the lower and upper bounds.
A missing classification is indicated with –.
Table 9: Examples of messages classified as level-0
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58 BBAb since the private draw is black, urn b is more likely to be the
true urn.
B 50 t1u
71 BAAAb The ball picked was black, right? So, there’s a greater
chance that it came from urn B than urn A
B 67 t1u
ABAAAb The ball picked was black. There are two black balls in urn
B and only one black ball in urn A. Therefore, there’s a 2/3
chance the ball came from urn B and a 1/3 chance it came
from urn A.
B 66 t1u
BBABa Urn A contains two white balls and urn B contains one.
Therefore, there’s a 2/3 chance the ball came from urn A.
A 67 t1u
72 BAAAb It would be foolish not to choose the urn with the greater
proportion of black balls.
B 67 t1u
81 BAAAb it doesnt matter what the other teams found there is still a
higher probability that a black ball is chosen from the urb B
therefore i would choose b
B 66 t1u
ABAAAb there is still a higher chance that the black ball is chosen (2/3
versus 1/3) therefore i would still choose B it doesnt matter
what the other teams chose
B 66 t1u
BBABa it doesnt matter the order of sequence of the other teams
i would still choose A since the probability of choosing a
white ball is twice that of a black ball (2/3 vs. 1/3) therefore,
i would still choose A
A 66 t1u
84 BAAAb I don’t see how the previous draws affect anything. We got
black, it’s 2/3 chance from B, 1/3 chance from A unless I’m
completely confused.
B 67 t1u
ABAAAb 2/3 chance that black ball is from B, 1/3 chance from A B 67 t1u
85 BAAAb there is a 66.7% chance that the ball is black. i’m not sure
how the previous draws would affect our guess
B 66 t1u
ABAAAb I think it would be the best to stick with urn B since the
probability is in favor of that.
B 66 t1u
BBABa I went with A because the chances it came from A are more
likely that B.
A 66 t1u
97 BAAAb If the other teams are mostly going with A, and we have a
black ball, I think our best choice is B.
B – t1u
ABAAAb I think we have a better chance selecting urn B. B 50 –
BBABa I think since we are drawing a white ball, our best chance is
to select from urn A.
A 100 t1u
98 BAAAb Urn B has the most black balls B 60 –
ABAAAb Even though th teams before mostly picked A, I don’t think
that should have a bearing on the choice here; B still has the
higher statistical probability of having a black ball
B 60 t1u
Notes: “Classification” gives the set of possible levels k not ruled out by the lower and upper bounds.
A missing classification is indicated with –.
Table 10: Examples of messages classified as level-1
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1 BBAb It is more likely that a black ball came from Urn B, and 2/3
of the other teams have made this same choice.
B 75 t2u
BAABAb A black ball is more likely to have come from Urn B. Not
enough teams have gone before us to be affected by the fact
that 3/5 of them selected A
B 60 t2u
BAAa A white ball is more likely to be from Urn A, and 2/3 of the
previous teams have selected this urn as well
A 75 t2u
8 BBAb Since 2 out of 3 of the previous teams chose urn B, and our
draw corresponds to that choice, I’d say that urn b is a good
bet.
B 70 t2u
BAABAb this is a tough one, but based on our draw, B is a good choice.
Also, 2 out of 5 other teams chose B
B 55 t2u
BAAa 2 out of 3 previous teams chose A and our draw corresponds
to A as well.
A 70 t2u
56 BAAa I’m choosing this based on the other teams and our draw.
Also, I think I forgot to press enter for the last message...
So for the last one, I made that decision based on the other
teams draws not ours.
A 75 t2u
80 BAAAb 3 out of 4 previous teams are picking A so that is more
likely they probably decide to pick A because see a white
ball drawn
A 90 t2u
ABAAAb there are 5 teams before us and 4 of them choose A, so i
am confident that it is A most of them must see a white ball
from A
A 98 t2u
BBABa 4 teams before us and 3 of them picked B so I would pick B B 85 t2u
82 BAAAb Most people must have seen a white draw for there to be
predominatley A being chosen.
A 75 t2u
ABAAAb It seems that most people saw a white ball in their private
draw.
A 60 t2u
BBABa Hard to say, still though most people seem to have seen a
black ball.
B 55 t2u
86 BAAAb Only because 3 teams chose A A – t2u
ABAAAb 4 out of 5 say A A 60 t2u
88 BAAAb 3 white balls in a row from the black urn is only a
(1/3)times(1/3) times (1/3) chance - therefore, very low. I
suspect that people chose urn A if they got a white ball
A 75 t2u
ABAAAb I assume teams chose urn A if they drew white. The chance
of getting 4 whites from Urn B is very low therefore I believe
it is urn A. Even though we drew a black, it’s still greater
probability that it is A
A 75 t2u
BBABa It appears from previous teams choices that 3 of the 4 balls
were black. Therefore, even though we drew a white ball,
it’s more likely that our urn is B
B 70 t2u
Notes: “Classification” gives the set of possible levels k not ruled out by the lower and upper bounds.
Table 11: Examples of messages classified as level-2 (continued next table)
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100 BAAAb since 3 of the teams before us chose A, we might assume
that they got a white ball. we may have just gotten a black
ball by chance from urn A
A 80 t2u
ABAAAb since most teams before us have chosen A, we may assume
that most of them got the white ball from their drawing. us-
ing probability, it’s more likely that we got a black by with
1/3 chance than the previous teams getting a white ball from
urn B with much lower probability
A 80 t2u
BBABa we can assume that team 1 got the black ball, team 2 proba-
bly also got the black ball, and team 3 probably got the white
ball. probability wise, it’s more likely that its from urn B
B 80 t2u
101 BAAAb Okay so the teams before us chose A more frequently, which
means they private draw must have been white, with one
black. We got a black one, but since its a 50% chance that
both urns could be the true urn, we can attribute ours to sim-
ple probability Thus, we have a 75% chance of it being A
More frequency-better chance it comes from one urn than
the other
A 75 t2u
ABAAAb Frequency of a is greater than B, thus, it’s a good chance
its urn A because although we picked black 4 whites to two
blacks shows a 2 to 1 ratio meaning that for everty 3 balls, 2
are white and one is black this reflects the probabilty of urn
A
A 90 t2u
BBABa The first team must have seen a black ball and chose B
second team probably got black as well so chose B third
team probably got white and decided to go with A 4th team
got black again and went with B Thus if we assume all the
choices before are rational then the choices are more black
than white thus B MUST be the rationally right answer as in
if you don’t pick B, it would be quite irrational
B 80 t2u
106 BAAAb Given that we were shown a black ball, there is a 2/3 chance
that it is in B. However, the other teams chose A, which
means that they were given a white ball, meaning that there
is a greater chance of A
A 90 t2u
Notes: “Classification” gives the set of possible levels k not ruled out by the lower and upper bounds.
Table 12: Examples of messages classified as level-2
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15 BBAb The first team definitely saw a black ball, they went in blind
and chose B The second team must have also saw a black
ball, and corroborated with what team 1 saw, the 3rd team
saw a white ball, which contradicted what the previous team
saw It is possible that the 2nd team saw white, but just went
along with team 1 so, I would say, out of 4 draws, there’s
certainly 1 black, 1 maybe black, and 1 white our draw is a
black one I am pretty confident that we should vote on urn
B
B 100 t3u
BAABAb team 1 saw black team 2 saw white, for sure team 3 saw
white for sure, since it could be influenced by either team
1 or 2, but chose to go with white team 4 saw black team
5 saw white team 5 has 2 guaranteed black before it, and 2
guaranteed white before it, but chose white, so probably got
white our draw is black, there’s 3 white, 2 black before us
I’d say its 50 50, let’s go with black, urn B since we’re sure
about what we saw
B 70 t2, 3u
BAAa same logic, lets go with A since majority came out as white A 100 t2u
46 BBAb Teams 1 and 2 probably saw a black ball, and team 3 a white
ball 3 blacks and 1 white is much more likely for urn b
B 75 t2u
BAABAb Team 1 probably drew a black ball, as they have no informa-
tion Team 2 must have drawn white, if they chose A despite
team 1’s decision to choose black Team 3 probably drew
white as well, as the previous teams decisions are split so
they decide on their own team 4 must have drawn black, as
them drawing white would be totally agains ttheir choice to
choose B It’s 50-50
A 50 t2, 3u
BAAa draws are almost purely based on the individual ball draw,
as the disparity of information in the teams previous theirs
indicates 3 white balls to 1 black ball, basically
A 75 –
74 ABAAAb It seems the other teams saw more white balls though it is
possible the third and the fourth team actuall saw black balls
but they had to make a random choince.
A 50 t3u
BBABa team 1 and team 4 drew black balls and team 3 and team 5
drew white. therefore it is a 50/50 chance.
A 50 t0u
Notes: “Classification” gives the set of possible levels k not ruled out by the lower and upper bounds.
A missing classification is indicated with –.
Table 13: Examples of messages classified as level-3 (continued next table)
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93 BAAAb Well, from our observations it seems that we would be
choosing Urn B. However, if we look at previous guesses,
a desire may be made to choose Urn A from belieivng that
other people must be drawing white balls. We have to con-
sider the fact that other teams are also being influenced by
previous decisions. For example, team 4 may have drawn a
black ball and wanted to choose Urn B, but didn’t in order to
match the previous people. Therefore, I still think we should
choose Urn B.
B 50 t3u
ABAAAb Even though we drew a black ball, feel that for 80% of peo-
ple to have chosen A, this may indicate that white is the
majority. However, I’m not sure at all, due to previous peo-
ple also being influenced by previous decisions. We know
that the first decision is not based off of previous decisions,
therefore we can assume that the first person drew a white
ball. The second person contrasted the first person so we
can assume they went by their ball and chosen B. The third
person was going off of a balanced group where half of the
people had chosen whtie and half of the people had chosen
black, therefore their decision is valid too. After that it was
based on how people analyzed it somewhat. I believe the
fourth person would still have stayed with what they got so
I think A is better.
A 50 t3u
BBABa We know that the first person would stick to what ball they
drew, therefore it can be decided to be B. The second person
would have no reason to follow the first person since its just
one statistic so they are probably accurate too. The third
person needed a reason to deviate so they were definitely A.
The last person probably would have stayed with what they
got so I think it was B, regardless of our drawing.
B 70 t2u
Notes: “Classification” gives the set of possible levels k not ruled out by the lower and upper bounds.
Table 14: Examples of messages classified as level-3
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A.2. Specification Test
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) check for unknown types by testing whether some
subjects’ fingerprints are closer to each other (“pseudotypes”) than to a theoretical
type. Such “clusters” of multiple subjects could suggest a common, but not predicted
way of thinking. As opposed to the C¸K data analyzed in section 3.3, my experiment
confronts all subjects with the same six situations, enabling such a specification test.
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) define a cluster as “a group of two or more
subjects such that: (a) each subject’s original estimated type has smaller likelihood
than the pseudotypes of all other subjects in the group; and (b) all subjects in the
group make ‘sufficiently similar’ guesses” (pp. 1761-1762). I correspondingly define
a cluster as a group of two or more subjects such that: (a) the p-value of the originally
estimated theoretical type is higher than the p-values with respect to the pseudotypes
of all other subjects in the group; and (b) all subjects in the group make guesses that
are significantly closer to each other than random play (p   0.05).
The analysis yields six clusters as shown in table 15. Two clusters feature regular-
ities that might explain some of the discrepancy between messages and decisions as
mere errors. Cluster D features four players who persistently put the wrong sign on
their thresholds, thus exhibiting probably the most simple and extreme case of decision
error (see figure 3a). Reversing the sign of their thresholds leads to a partial agreement
with the messages that categorized some as level-1 or level-2. Relatedly, cluster E fea-
tures four players who share a pronounced tendency towards negative numbers which
is probably due to a faulty calculation not featured by other players (see figure 3b).
Featuring less persistent regularities, clusters B, C, and F consist of players who are
significantly closer than random play only to level-2 play. Players in cluster B and C
start off with higher thresholds than level-2 in round 1, in cluster B they also choose a
smaller fourth threshold. Players in cluster F start off with lower thresholds in round
1. Overall, all those clusters seem to form due to more or less persistent regularities,
which probably do not result from an entirely different kind of thinking.
Although the decisions were chosen to discriminate as much as possible between
level-2, level-3 and Bayesian types, the specification test yields one large set A of
overlapping and non-nested clusters of 19 players. Most of these players are classified
by the fingerprints and messages as level-2, level-3 or Bayesian. While the fingerprint
data is theoretically able to discriminate between these types, decision noise partially
prevents this in an analysis with only 6 decisions. In that instance the messages are
more informative.
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Cluster Subjects Characteristic
A 2, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23,
27, 29, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 42
Level-2, Level-3 or Bayesian
B 4, 17 Level-2, deviation round 1
(pos.), round 4 (neg.)
C 5, 28, 31 Level-2, deviation round 1
(pos.)
D 11, 19, 35, 40 Switched sign
E 15, 18, 32, 41 Neg. deviation throughout
F 20, 30 Level-2, deviation round 1
(neg.)
Notes: A is not a proper cluster, it is the union of overlapping, non-nested clusters.
Table 15: Clusters in the specification test
(a) Mistaken sign, subject 35. (b) Negative deviation thoughout, subject 15.
Figure 3
Subjects’ and types’ “fingerprints” in the team experiments a` la C¸K
A.3. Additional tables
A.3.1. AH framework with intra-team communication
Highest level ( 1.76)
0 1 2 3 NA Total
0 5 0 6 0 0 11
Lowest level 1 13 5 0 0 18
( 1.50) 2 42 3 0 45
3 2 0 2
NA 30 30
Total 5 13 53 5 30 106
Table 16: Level classification in second three decisions, AH framework
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Urn choice
1 2 3 4 5 6
Information BBAb BAABAb BAAa BBABa ABAAAb BAAAb
Level-0 5 7 7 8 5 8
Level-1 5 10 3 12 16 17
Level-2 40 29 44 39 40 36
Level-3 3 2 3 1 4 4
NA 53 58 49 46 41 41
Total 106 106 106 106 106 106
Table 17: Level classification by urn choice, AH framework
A.3.2. C¸K framework with intra-team communication
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
(0) 17 40.5
1 12 28.6
2 10 23.8
3 2 4.8
B 1 2.4
Total 42 100.00
(a) Classification by lowest significant SSD
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
(0) 17.00 40.5
1 12.00 28.6
2 10.00 23.8
3 1.89 4.5
B 1.11 2.6
Total 42 100.00
(b) Classification by p-value below 0.05
Table 18: Type overview for 42 subjects in first three decisions, C¸K framework
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
(0) 18 42.9
1 9 21.4
2 8 19.0
3 0 0.0
B 7 16.7
Total 42 100.00
(a) Classification by lowest significant SSD
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
(0) 18.00 42.9
1 9.00 21.4
2 8.55 20.4
3 0.33 0.8
B 6.11 14.6
Total 42 100.00
(b) Classification by p-value below 0.05
Table 19: Type overview for 42 subjects in second three decisions, C¸K framework
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Highest level ( 2.11)
0 1 2 3 NA Total
0 1 0 1 2 0 4
Lowest level 1 2 2 0 0 4
( 1.68) 2 15 2 0 17
3 3 0 3
NA 14 14
Total 1 2 18 7 14 42
Table 20: Level classification in second three decisions, C¸K framework
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
B. Online Appendix
B.1. Individual data
Subject Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Bayesian
ID SSD p SSD p SSD p SSD p
1 549.13 0.671 1475.83 0.801 1143.33 0.750 1255.61 0.697
2 522.00 0.585 1022.00 0.183 870.75 0.199 850.50 0.202
3 714.61 0.964 946.61 0.095 777.61 0.224 823.28 0.140
4 331.00 0.068 131.00 0.000 134.75 0.000 99.08 0.000
5 1500.00 1.000 375.00 0.000 656.25 0.107 610.19 0.040
6 289.86 0.029 1020.36 0.237 796.35 0.306 721.46 0.178
7 725.00 0.970 200.00 0.000 368.75 0.004 441.56 0.012
8 700.00 0.954 25.00 0.000 268.75 0.003 170.86 0.000
9 255.00 0.012 320.00 0.000 203.75 0.000 298.23 0.001
10 627.00 0.862 97.00 0.000 245.75 0.001 177.84 0.000
11 687.17 0.943 275.17 0.000 156.42 0.000 168.43 0.000
12 423.00 0.260 818.00 0.027 426.75 0.009 595.65 0.016
13 661.25 0.914 51.25 0.000 117.50 0.000 97.09 0.000
14 400.01 0.197 450.01 0.002 363.01 0.003 494.64 0.006
15 838.61 0.997 394.61 0.001 310.11 0.002 318.56 0.001
16 883.00 0.999 158.00 0.000 289.25 0.002 305.77 0.001
17 0.02 0.000 723.65 0.059 536.24 0.034 529.73 0.033
18 100.00 0.000 475.00 0.014 243.75 0.001 269.21 0.002
19 186.39 0.001 548.09 0.023 555.54 0.041 575.62 0.055
20 224.69 0.005 485.09 0.004 316.89 0.001 328.71 0.002
21 524.25 0.593 120.25 0.000 140.75 0.000 112.44 0.000
22 391.00 0.175 656.00 0.035 528.50 0.042 587.05 0.042
23 421.00 0.254 141.00 0.000 137.25 0.000 124.54 0.000
24 242.25 0.008 52.25 0.000 162.25 0.000 115.79 0.000
25 308.25 0.043 743.25 0.012 415.75 0.007 607.40 0.013
26 1386.52 1.000 783.02 0.062 929.27 0.552 936.15 0.324
27 1171.15 1.000 1182.65 0.163 845.15 0.150 947.88 0.159
28 444.25 0.324 194.25 0.000 209.25 0.000 214.01 0.000
29 1028.33 1.000 258.33 0.000 490.58 0.006 389.41 0.001
30 514.66 0.561 602.66 0.019 455.91 0.019 456.18 0.010
31 893.26 0.999 537.26 0.003 538.26 0.030 522.84 0.008
32 619.25 0.847 939.25 0.043 684.25 0.073 834.31 0.064
33 5.00 0.000 885.00 0.093 652.50 0.054 740.49 0.071
34 396.98 0.190 1331.88 0.579 1110.53 0.705 1001.84 0.453
35 899.00 0.999 389.00 0.001 521.50 0.045 494.42 0.016
36 500.00 0.511 175.00 0.000 243.75 0.001 168.24 0.000
37 197.13 0.002 659.63 0.011 268.38 0.001 475.27 0.005
38 103.00 0.000 768.00 0.156 545.50 0.127 723.30 0.202
39 1500.00 1.000 575.00 0.013 881.25 0.444 669.35 0.066
40 807.11 0.995 505.11 0.023 727.31 0.309 665.61 0.174
Table 21: Type analysis in data of C¸elen and Kariv (2004)
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B.2. Learning in C¸elen and Kariv (2004)
In order to investigate learning over the course of C¸K’s experiment, table 25 shows the
fingerprint analysis by the first 8 and the last 7 rounds. None of the two classifications
yields significantly different results (Chi-squared test, p  0.114, pmix  0.638).
The data from fewer rounds is less distinctive, the classification thus features more
subjects that are not significantly close to any type. This fraction is stable around a
quarter of the subjects. Regarding the identified types, both the classification by the
lowest significant SSDk (left) and by the p-values below 0.05 (right) indicate that the
fraction of level-1 players reduces over time while the fraction of level-2 and level-
3 players increases. For Bayesians, the two classifications yield different tendencies,
which might be due to an insufficient differentiation between level-3 and Bayesian
types. Overall, the numbers indicate some learning over time and a tendency towards
higher level inference. There is, however, no strong convergence to level-3 or rational
Bayesian play.
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
1 10 25.0
2 13 32.5
3 0 0.0
B 7 17.5
NA 10 25.0
Total 40 100.00
(a) Classification by lowest significant
SSD, first 8 rounds
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
1 8.50 21.3
2 12.22 30.6
3 2.87 7.2
B 5.41 13.5
NA 11.00 27.5
Total 40 100.00
(b) Classification by p-value below 0.05,
first 8 rounds
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
1 6 15.0
2 18 45.0
3 4 10.0
B 3 7.5
NA 9 22.5
Total 40 100.00
(c) Classification by lowest significant
SSD, last 7 rounds
Type Frequency Fraction (%)
1 4.04 10.1
2 14.58 36.5
3 5.12 12.8
B 6.26 15.6
NA 10.00 25.0
Total 40 100.00
(d) Classification by p-value below 0.05,
last 7 rounds
Table 25: Type overview for 40 subjects in C¸K, early and late rounds
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C. Experiment instructions (AH framework)
Welcome to the experiment!
Introduction
You are about to participate in an experiment in team decision making. The experiment is
funded by Cornell University. Please follow the instructions carefully.
In addition to the participation fee of $5, you may earn a considerable additional amount of
money. Your decisions determine the additional amount. You will be instructed in detail how
your earnings depend on your decisions. All that you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to
you in private, in cash, after today’s session.
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s screens. If you
have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an experi-
menter will come to you. If you talk, shout out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave. Thank
you.
The experiment consists of a test round and 2 parts. Part I is designed as a warm-up with
3 trivia questions. Part II consists of 2 rounds of 3 decisions each. In all 6 decisions your task
will be identical and success is identically rewarded.
Since this is a team experiment, you will be randomly matched with another participant in
this room, to form a team that plays as one entity. Your teammate will change every round, so
please do not assume content of previous communication to be known by your new partner.
The way you interact as a team to take decisions will be the same throughout all rounds.
Now, let me explain how your Team’s Action is determined. In fact, both your teammate
and you will enter a Final Decision individually and the computer will choose randomly which
one of your two final decisions counts as your team’s action. The probability that your team-
mate’s final decision is chosen is equal to the probability that your final decision will be chosen
(i. e. your chances are 50:50). However, you have the possibility to influence your partner’s
final decision in the following way: Before you enter your final decision, you can propose to
your partner a Suggested Decision and send him one and only one text Message. Note
that this message is your only chance to convince your partner of the reasoning behind your
suggested decision. Therefore, use the message to explain your suggested decision to your
teammate. After you finish entering your suggested decision and your message, these will be
shown to your teammate. Simultaneously, you will receive your partner’s suggested decision
and message. Both of you will then make your final decision. As outlined above, once you
both enter your final decision, the computer chooses randomly one of your final decisions as
your team’s action.
If you have any questions at this point, please raise your hand. In order for you to get familiar
with the messaging system, you will now try it out in a Test Period. Please turn the page for
further instructions.
Test period
A participant in this room is now randomly chosen to be your teammate. The Test Period
has two rounds, with communication in each round. Since this is only a test, your earnings
will not depend on anything that happens now. In both test rounds you will need to send and
receive pieces of information. The information consists of the answer to a question and one
given phrase. After the successful exchange, you will enter the number again. This way, the
communication structure is identical to the one in the experiment rounds.
The messenger allows Messages of any size. However, you have to enter the message
line by line since the input space is only one line. Within this line you can delete by using the
usual “Backspace” button of your keyboard. By pressing “Enter” on the keyboard, you add
the written sentence to the message. Please note that only added sentences will be sent and
seen by your partner. The words in the blue input line will not be sent. You can always delete
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previously added sentences by clicking the “Clear Input” button. The number of lines you send
is not limited. You can therefore send messages of any length. You finally send the message
to your partner by clicking the “Send Message” button.
If you have any questions at this point, please raise your hand. When you are ready, please
click the “Ready” button to start the Test Period.
Experiment - Part II
You are about to start Part II of the experiment.21 This part consists of 2 periods of 3 deci-
sions each.22 In each period you will team up with a different, randomly chosen participant.
Therefore you will make 3 urn choices with a given partner.
The 6 scenarios for your urn choices are taken from another experiment. They are randomly
chosen and simply allow me to confront you with more scenarios than if we played it out
ourselves. I will now explain the setup to you in the same fashion the participants of the
original experiment were instructed. The original experiment was not done by teams, but I will
explain it with teams for simplicity.
In each urn choice your task is the following:
Your team is asked to predict from which randomly chosen urn a ball was drawn. It is
equally likely that urn A or urn B will be the true urn. That is, there is a 50 percent chance that
Urn A is the true urn, and a 50 percent chance that Urn B is the true urn. Urn A contains 2
white balls, and 1 black ball. Urn B contains 1 white ball and 2 black balls. Therefore, there
is a 23 chance that a white ball comes from urn A and a
2
3 chance that a black ball comes from
urn B.
To help determine which urn is the right one in a given scenario, you will see one ball, drawn
at random, from the urn. Only your team will see the outcome of this private draw. And your
team will only see this one draw, you will get the same information as your teammate. After
each draw, the ball is returned to the container before making the next draw. Therefore, each
team will have one private draw, with the ball being replaced after each draw. This way each
team draws from an urn that contains 3 balls in total.
When it is your turn to decide, bold text in the top of your screen will give you information
about your draw. If the ball the computer has randomly drawn for you is white, your window
will read, “Your team’s private draw from the urn is WHITE.” Your window will read, “Your
team’s private draw from the urn is BLACK.”, if the ball the computer has randomly drawn
for you is black.
In each scenario, decisions are made sequentially, i.e. one team after the other. The
order in which teams decide in a given scenario is determined randomly. Once the first team
has agreed on its action based on its private draw, the second team will be asked to make its
decision. The members of team 2 will see their private draw, and also which urn was chosen
by the first team. Until the end of the round, all following teams will be informed about the
chosen urns of all earlier teams, but not about the other teams’ draw from the urn.
In each round, you see the three scenarios and will write down your Suggested Decision
and Message for each of them. After that you see your partner’s Suggested Decision and
Message for each of the three scenarios and will make your Final Decisions. Finally, you will
be informed about your Team’s Action and the true urn. The order of events is illustrated in
the table below. For each of the 6 scenarios, if your team’s action and the chosen urn coincide,
you will individually earn $1.00 (your teammate will get $1.00 as well).
As described earlier, you will send your teammate a Suggested Decision and a Message.
Remember to explain in the message your reasoning behind your suggested decision. (And
21The experiment consists of two parts, part I being independent of part II.
22Table 26 was shown to give an overview.
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note again that the words in the blue input line will not be sent. Press “Enter” to add them
to the message.) After this information is exchanged, both of you enter your Final Decision,
from which the computer randomly chooses the Team’s Action.
As part of the communication, you can quantify your Confidence for each choice you make.
You can put numbers between 50% and 100%, where 50% implies that you think both urns are
equally likely and higher numbers reflect your higher confidence in your choice, up to certainty
(100%).
Let me summarize the main points: (1) In each scenario, it is equally likely that urn A or urn
B is the true urn. (2) There is a 23 chance that a white ball came from urn A and a
2
3 chance
that a black ball came from urn B. (3) In the knowledge of the previous teams’ actions and your
draw, choose either urn A or urn B. (4) Like you, other teams saw one draw from the true urn
and their predecessors’ urn choice. (5) If your team chooses the true urn, you will earn $1.00.
If you have any questions at this point, please raise your hand. When you click the “Ready”
button, you will start the first round of the experiment.
Round Urn choice Action
Ó
1
1
Suggested DecisionÓ 2
Ó 3
Ó 1
Final DecisionÓ 2
Ó 3
Ó 1
Get resultÓ 2
Ó 3
Ó
2
4
Suggested DecisionÓ 5
Ó 6
Ó 4
Final DecisionÓ 5
Ó 6
Ó 4
Get resultÓ 5
Ó 6
Table 26: Order of events in Part II.
D. Classification instructions (AH framework)
In the following I will describe the classification process for the analysis of an experiment.
Subjects play a game of incomplete information. Their reasoning will be classified along the
lines of a model of level of reasoning, which will be laid out in the first section. It is set up in
analogy to the level-k model in complete information settings as introduced by Nagel (1995)
and Camerer et al. (2004).
Follow the instructions of this booklet. Read them entirely to get an overview and then start
the classification. The game is the social learning experiment as implemented by Anderson
and Holt (1997), which I assume you are fully familiar with. The subjects were put in 6 different
situations that occurred in the original study by Anderson and Holt (1997) and decided in a
team about their action, which would be remunerated according to the true urn in Anderson
and Holt (1997).
The model will introduce four different ways of reasoning in the context of this game. The
aim of the classification is to take a look at the 6 messages per player and connect him/her with
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one or more types. Details will be explained below. Please limit yourself to making inferences
only from what can clearly be derived from the message stated, i.e. do not try to think about
what the player might have thought.
Reasoning types in the model
In the context of social learning, reasoning types differ in the ways they process private infor-
mation (in form of draws from an urn) and public information (in form of actions of predeces-
sors). A natural model of level of reasoning starts out with a random level-0 type and builds a
hierarchy based on the number of iterated best responses. In this game, this hierarchy turns
out as follows:
Level-0 Randomizing between A and B, irrespective of own private signal.
Level-1 If others’ signal is not informative, like level-0 random play, then the best response
is to get informed by the own signal. Therefore, level-1 players are following their own
private signal.
Level-2 Since level-1 play is fully informative about the private signals, the best response in
light of this is to follow the majority if it is ahead by more than one signal difference.
A level-2 player will thus only follow his signal if the previous actions were split equally
between the two urns or one urn was chosen just one time more often.
Level-3 Since level-2 play is as informative as Bayesian play, level-3 play, a best-response, is
like original Bayesian play. This implies that the play and beliefs of level-3 players are
identical to play and beliefs in the Bayesian equilibrium if everybody is level-3.
Starting from this model, I will now explain some expected message contents for the indi-
vidual levels of reasoning.
Level-0 Random play should result from messages that clearly do not understand the nature
of the game or put reasons for play that are orthogonal to any reasonable inference
using private signal and previous actions.
Level-1 Level-1 is characterized by disregarding others’ signal. In the message, this can
be an open disregard of others’ actions or an emphasis on the unambiguity of the own
signal.
Level-2 A level-2 players with a degenerate population belief (as introduced in the model
above) implies that all others’ actions are taken at face value like a signal. It follows
that the ratio of As vs. Bs in the previous actions might weighted against the 2/3 chance
of the own signal to be correct. In any case, a level-2 player never engages in a dif-
ferentiation of individual predecessors. If everybody is assumed to play their signal,
this implies that others are regarded as a homogeneous crowd that simply differs in the
signals they received not in their position in the sequence. Alternatively to a degener-
ate population belief, a level-2 player might think that some players played random, like
level-0. Then, the signals are not taken at full face value and probably the own signal is
valued more than the observed actions.
Level-3 heterogeneity Under a degenerate population belief, only level-3 players distin-
guish individual predecessors in the extent to which their actions reflect their private
signals. It is therefore a characteristic of level-3 players to differentiate informative and
uninformative observed actions depending on the position of predecessors in the se-
quence. One example is that a level-3 player will note in a history of AAAA that the later
players might just have followed the majority, he therefore does not infer those players
signal with certaint. Put starkly, observing BBBA implies that a level-3 player rules out
the fourth player to be level-2, an observation only level-3 will make.
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The data
You will see different situations in which the players decided to choose urn A or urn B.
Each situation is explained in brackets by the information available to the subject. The
capital letters indicate previous players’ actions. The small letters indicate the private signal
received by the player at hand. In addition to the sent message, you see the suggested
decision, which is 1 for urn A and 2 for urn B. The communication was structured in the sense
that it gave the players the possibility to indicate the confidence in the own urn choice. This
number is given to you as well.
The classification
I would like you to classify messages into one of the 4 levels described above. Indicate the
closest type under ‘level’ in the according space.
Indicate whether the population belief is degenerate on the next lower level or non-degenerate.
If it is non-degenerate, denote which types (in terms of levels) are assumed to be present.
In addition to this classification, I ask you to indicate any difference between the observed
reasoning and the type given. This might include differences in the belief about when others
start imitating others’ actions, the weight the public information receives compared to the pri-
vate information, the way the population updating is done by a level-3 player, etc. Also, if you
think the potential level could be more than one, indicate your considerations here.
E. Experiment instructions (C¸K framework)
The experiment instructions in German combine the communication instructions (see Intro-
duction and Test period above) with instructions from C¸elen and Kariv (2004) translated to
German and adapted to the team setting. A translation is available upon request.
F. Classification instructions (C¸K framework)
In the following I will describe the classification process for the analysis of an experiment.
Subjects play a game of incomplete information. Their reasoning will be classified along the
lines of a model of level of reasoning, which will be laid out in the first section. It is set up in
analogy to the level-k model in complete information settings as introduced by Nagel (1995)
and Camerer et al. (2004).
Follow the instructions of this booklet. Read them entirely to get an overview and then start
the classification. The game is the social learning experiment as implemented by C¸elen and
Kariv (2004), which I assume you are fully familiar with. The subjects in my experiment were
put in 6 different situations that occurred in the original study by C¸elen and Kariv (2004) and
decided in a team about their action, which would be remunerated according to the true signal
in C¸elen and Kariv (2004).
The model will introduce five different ways of reasoning in the context of this game. The
aim of the classification is to take a look at the 6 messages per player and connect him/her with
one or more types. Details will be explained below. Please limit yourself to making inferences
only from what can clearly be derived from the message stated, i.e. do not try to think about
what the player might have thought.
Reasoning types in the model
In the context of social learning, reasoning types differ in the ways they process private infor-
mation (in form of draws from an urn) and public information (in form of actions of predeces-
sors). C¸elen and Kariv (2004) analyse Bayesian behavior, which is fully rational and believes
others to be fully rational. Please consult the paper to get a thorough understanding of this
kind of reasoning in this context.
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A natural model of level of reasoning starts out with a random level-0 type and builds a
hierarchy based on the number of iterated best responses. In this game, this hierarchy turns
out as follows:
Level-0 Playing a random threshold on the action space.
Level-1 If others’ signals are not informative, like level-0 random play, then the best response
is to get informed by the own signal. Therefore, level-1 players are following their own
private signal and set a threshold of 0.
Level-2 With a threshold of 0, the observed action of a predecessor indicates whether the
signal was in r10, 0q or r0, 10s. With this information, the best response is to add 5
or subtract 5 for each previous action A or B in the expected value of the sum of the
signals. A level-2 player will thus expect a sum of signals of 0 if the history has equally
many A’s as B’s and, e.g., 5 if one more B’s than A’s have been observed and 10 if two
more B’s than A’s have been observed. The threshold will be set as the negative of the
expected sum.
Level-3 Thresholds of 10 or 10 lead to uninformative play since the action is decided irre-
spective of the signal. Level-3 players hence only use information from level-2 players
that are not cascading, i.e. play 5, 0, or 5.
Level-4 Level-4 players only use information from level-3 players that are not cascading. Al-
though level-4 play is distinct from level-3, we will not pursue this or higher levels in our
classification.
Starting from this model, I will now explain some expected message contents for the indi-
vidual levels of reasoning.
Level-0 Random play should result from messages that clearly do not understand the nature
of the game or put reasons for play that are orthogonal to any reasonable inference
using private signal and previous actions.
Level-1 Level-1 is characterized by disregarding others’ action. In the message, this can
be an open disregard of others’ actions or an emphasis on the unambiguity of the own
signal.
Level-2 A level-2 player with a degenerate population belief (as introduced in the model
above) implies that all others’ actions are equally informative and indicative of the
sign of the signal and thus each one changes the expected sum of signals by  5 or 5.
It follows that the relative number of As vs. Bs in the previous actions determine the
threshold. In any case, a level-2 player never engages in a differentiation of individ-
ual predecessors. If everybody is assumed to play their signal, this implies that others
are regarded as a homogeneous crowd that simply differs in the signals they received
not in their position in the sequence.
Level-3 heterogeneity Level-3 players are the first in the hierarchy to distinguish individual
predecessors in the extent to which their actions are informative about their private
signals. In particular, level-2 actions might be completely uninformative if they result
from a threshold of 10 or 10. At the same time, actions that result from a signal below
a threshold of 5 or above a threshold of 5 induce a strong change in the expected
sum of signals. Therefore, sum actions might have a stronger influence on the level-3’s
threshold than others. It is therefore a characteristic of level-3 players to differentiate
more or less informative observed actions depending on the position of predecessors in
the sequence and the likely threshold they had set. One example is that a level-3 player
will note in a history of AB that the second player’s signal must have been very low since
a threshold of5 was still undercut. This informativeness changes to uninformativeness
when the threshold is expected to be 10 or 10. Then, the action is uninformative.
Bayesian More than level-3 players, Bayesian players realize that every predecessor has
most likely set a different threshold. This way, particular later actions in the sequence
can have a strong influence on the expected sum of signals and thus the set threshold.
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The data
You will see different situations in which the players observed histories of A’s and B’s and set
a Suggested Decision between 10 and 10.
Each situation is described by the information available to the subject. In addition to the
sent message, you see the suggested decision.
The classification
I would like you to classify messages into one of the 5 levels described above. Indicate the
closest type under ‘level’ in the according space.
Indicate whether the population belief is degenerate on the next lower level or non-degenerate.
If it is non-degenerate, denote which types (in terms of levels) are assumed to be present.
In addition to this classification, I ask you to indicate any difference between the observed
reasoning and the type given. This might include differences in the belief about what threshold
is assumed to be behind others actions, the way the population updating is done by a level-
3 player, etc. Also, if you think the potential level could be more than one, indicate your
considerations here.
Please also note that some messages contain considerations regarding the threshold to set
etc. which are orthogonal to the inferential considerations. Please make sure to only classify
according to the strategic content.
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